The Aggregate Productivity Effect of Labour and Capital Market Distortions in Canada

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Abstract

How efficiently are workers, investment capital, and production distributed across firms in Canada? And how have they varied over time, across regions, and between sectors? To answer these questions, we present novel measures of the degree of resource misallocation over time and space using uniquely detailed firm-level data (T2-LEAP) between 2001 and 2015. We find the dispersion of marginal returns to both capital and labour across firms have increased significantly during this period, suggesting allocative efficiency is deteriorating. Using a rich but tractable multi-sector model of heterogeneous firms, we find this rising misallocation accounts for over three-quarters of the increased productivity gap between Canada and the United States over this period. Specifically, our estimates suggest that increasing misallocation of labour and capital may lower aggregate productivity by 8.5 percent – equivalent to a real income decline of $200 billion per year.

JEL Classification: D24, E24, O4, O51

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1 Introduction

The Canadian economy experienced several macroeconomic shocks since 2000, including the financial crisis, the energy booms and busts, the auto sector disruption, dramatically rising imports from China, and more. The impact of these shocks, however, varies across sectors and regions, and therefore causes migration of labour and movement of capital across those sectors and regions. Barriers like migration costs, interprovincial trade costs and financial market frictions, however, may both distort the allocation of resources and disrupt their efficient adjustment to shocks. In this paper, we quantify the magnitude and consequences of potential resource misallocation across firms in Canada between 2001 and 2015 using a detailed data of the (near) universe of Canadian firms in Statistics Canada’s T2-LEAP. We explore specifically how the dispersion in factor returns varies over time, across regions, and across sectors. And with the aid of a rich multi-sector model of Canada’s economy featuring a continuum of heterogeneous firms and factor market frictions, we quantify the overall effect of allocative inefficiencies on Canada’s aggregate productivity.

Before providing details, let us provide some intuition. In a well-functioning market, the allocation of workers, inputs and investment, are determined by prices. Productive firms or sectors that can pay higher wages, for example, will naturally hire more workers and expand in size relative to other firms or sectors. The resulting equilibrium allocation will tend to maximize productivity and incomes. What does such an allocation look like? Consider a world with two sectors. Workers are free to move between them, but each additional worker will add less to the firm’s value. That is, there’s diminishing returns to labour and other inputs. If labour has a different value, at the margin, across firms, then there is scope to move workers to higher value uses to increase overall output. Thus, the optimal allocation of labour equalizes the marginal value of each worker across all firms and sectors. Measured deviations from this may therefore be evidence of misallocation. Our analysis starts by measuring the distance between the Canadian economy and such an efficient benchmark.

Overall, we find worsening allocative efficiency in Canada. From 2001 to 2015, the variances of both capital and labour returns between firms have increased substantially. Much of the increase is driven by the more dispersed firm productivity in Western provinces and Ontario and it is widely spread across most significant industries in the Canadian economy. We demonstrate through a simple model that rising dispersion in returns of this kind is a cause of lower aggregate productivity. To quantify the effect more precisely, we develop a model of heterogeneous firms based on Hsieh and Klenow (2009) that can be mapped to key moments in the data. We estimate that a full 8.5 percentage reduction in Canada’s aggregate TFP, equivalent to nearly $200 billion in foregone real income per year, can be attributed to the increased labour and capital misallocation across firms from 2001 to 2015. This accounts for roughly three-quarters of the rising productivity gap between Canada and the United States over this period. In addition, we find the reduction in aggregate TFP was driven entirely by misallocation across firms within each sector from 2001 to 2008. But after the financial crisis, firm-level distortions to the allocation of labour and capital between sectors became the dominant contributor to lower aggregate TFP.
Our estimates are derived from Statistics Canada’s administrative firm-level dataset T2-LEAP and covers the years 2001 through to 2015. This dataset contains longitudinal information on every incorporated Canadian firm hiring employees, including firms’ revenue, capital stock, payroll, industry and province. With minimal assumptions that we detail in the next section, we measure the dispersion of capital and labour returns across firms by computing the variance of (log) marginal revenue products of labour and capital. We find substantial worsening of misallocation in Canada during 2001-2015, with a 20 percent rise in the dispersion of capital returns and a 15 percent increase in the labour market. The measured distortion in the capital market first declined in the early 2000s and started to increase shortly before the Great Recession and accelerated after 2011. In terms of labour misallocation, we observe an overall worsening trend although there is variation from this trend in particular years.

There are important differences between regions and sectors. Specifically, we find that Western provinces drive most of the increased distortion in the labour market. Ontario also contributes with a notable increase in measured capital misallocation after the financial crisis. We find Quebec and the Atlantic provinces see more moderate change in the dispersion of returns between firms in those regions. Different sectors also show distinct patterns in the changes in the measured between-firm misallocation. The energy sector, some manufacturing sectors (including the auto industry), as well as finance, insurance and real estate all experienced significant increases in the capital returns dispersion across firms. Not all large sectors experienced worsening allocative efficiency, however. Construction, wholesale and retail trade, for example, see little measured change in the returns to capital or labour between firms in those sectors. These within-sector effects are particularly important since it is only with our detailed administrative data that such measures may be computed. The sectoral results also lend themselves to additional quantitative analysis to estimate the aggregate implications of this rising misallocation.

To that end, we map these measures of marginal revenue product dispersion to a model of Canada’s economy to determine the effect of misallocation on aggregate productivity. We construct a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms based on Hsieh and Klenow (2009), where individual firms face wedges within both the labour and capital markets. Firm-level distortions to the allocation of labour and capital can cause a deviation of aggregate TFP from a hypothetically undistorted economy through both within-sector and between-sector effects. The within-sector distortion captures the distorted allocation of factors across firms within each sector, which reduces sectoral TFP. The between-sector distortion captures the distorted allocation of labour and capital across sectors, which can be summarized by the average firm-level distortions within each sector. Our estimates of the within-sector distortion require more structure be imposed on the data – specifically that firm-level distortions are log-normally distributed – while the between-sector distortions can be estimated more flexibly.¹

¹Our within-sector results can be interpreted as a robust first-order approximation of the true effect without this distributional assumption. We will demonstrate this in Section 2.
level in 2001 suggest that between 2001 and 2015 rising misallocation of labour and capital caused an 8.5 percentage point reduction in Canada’s aggregate TFP. This is a sizeable potential loss, equivalent to a staggering $16,000 in lost economic output per household per year. In addition, as the productivity gap between Canada and the United States increased by an estimated 11 percentage points, our results suggest that three-quarters of Canada’s widening productivity gap can be accounted for by rising factor market distortions across firms. Decomposing the effect of firm-level misallocation during this period, we find that aggregate productivity could be 6 percent higher if the between-sector distortion had remained constant. While labour market misallocation contributes most of the between-sector effect in levels, the falling efficiency in the capital market accounts fully for the deterioration of productivity caused by the between-sector distortion from 2001 to 2015. In the same period, the increased within-sector distortion is estimated to account for an overall decline in aggregate productivity of 3.1 percent. Much of this is driven by changes in the size of different sectors. Between 2001 to 2015, the expansion of sectors with relatively high within-sector distortions, including mining, oil and gas, utilities and wholesale, drives most of the worsening aggregate effect of within-sector distortion. Our finding of significant productivity losses from worsening of misallocation is robust to the choice of parameter values and firm entry and exit.

Our work builds on a large and growing literature on resource misallocation and productivity. In particular, Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Brandt et al. (2013), Bartelsman et al. (2013), Restuccia (2019), and Tombe and Zhu (2019) all find the economic costs from misallocation of capital, labour, and/or output can be substantial. Our method closely follows this literature. To the best of our knowledge, though, this paper is the first comprehensive attempt to quantify the magnitude and consequences of resource misallocation across firms in Canada over time. Our study is also related to an empirical literature that identifies changes of misallocation within a country as an important source of changes in productivity over time. Unlike these developing countries, the Canadian economy is a highly developed market economy, with little restriction on labour migration and a well-established financial market. Yet, we find resource misallocation could still play a critical role in the productivity and growth of the Canadian economy. Most recently and perhaps most notably related to our result is Bils et al. (2020), who find rising misallocation and worsening allocative efficiency in the United States over a roughly similar timeframe as ours. They attribute much, but not all, of this deterioration to measurement error in firm-level data. To the extent that the Canadian data may also suffer from this, our results should then be viewed as an upper-bound as measurement error lessens the magnitude of measured misallocation.

For policymakers, Canada’s economy-wide productivity has been a growing concern. Based on the most recent data from the Penn World Table, the Canadian economy’s productivity relative to the U.S. has fallen 11 percent from 2000 to 2015. Many have investigated possible factors behind it. For example, Calligaris (2015), Fujii and Nozawa (2013), Reis (2013), and Gopinath et al. (2017) study misallocation changes in countries experiencing slow productivity growth, while Chen and Irarrazabal (2015a) examines misallocation change in Chile during a period of fast productivity growth.
For example, Leung et al. (2008) and Baldwin et al. (2014) study how firm size distribution matter for the measured productivity gap, Tang (2017) and Almon and Tang (2011) focus on the impact of industrial structure, while Ranasinghe (2017) examines the importance of innovation spending on the productivity differences. Our study provides a new perspective by examining the changes in efficiency with which inputs are distributed across firms. We find that rising misallocation between sectors, especially in the capital market, contributes heavily to the lower aggregate productivity growth between 2001 and 2015. But further research is necessary to discover the specific sources of the labour and capital wedges we measure and to explore specific policy interventions to mitigate them or their effects.

Finally, our study is related to a group of papers that assesses changes in misallocation over the business cycle. For example, Oberfield (2013), Sandleris and Wright (2014), and Ziebarth (2013) examine how misallocation in an economy change during crises and recessions. While we do not measure the cyclical effects of misallocation on productivity explicitly, we discover some interesting changes pre- and post-2008 financial crisis. From 2001 to 2008, the within-sector distortion has worsened persistently. However, this trend stopped and revised after the financial crisis. Until 2015, half of the TFP loss caused by the increased within-sector misallocation during 2001-2008 was erased. On the other hand, the between-sector misallocation had only a slight net effect on the aggregate TFP from 2001 to 2008. Nevertheless, it deteriorates rapidly post-crisis, particularly after 2010. This suggests that how misallocation changes after a recession might be quite different at the firm level versus the industry level.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we first establish the connection between misallocation and marginal returns across firms using a simple model, then introduce the data and how we use it to measure these marginal returns. We also present the changes in the dispersion of labour and capital returns over time. In Section 3, we construct a model of heterogeneous firms that maps marginal product variation to aggregate productivity. In Section 4, based on numerous counterfactual experiments in the model, we quantify the changes of misallocation from 2001 to 2015 and their effects on aggregate productivity based on our model. In Section 5, we discuss the policy implications of our results. Section 6 concludes.

2 Misallocation in Canada

In this sector, we first demonstrate the connection between misallocation and marginal returns across firms using a simple model. We then describe the data and introduce our measure marginal returns across firms, sectors, and regions using firm-level information. Finally, we discuss general patterns we uncover before turning to a full quantitative model.

2.1 Misallocation: A Primer

Misallocation results when marginal returns are not equalised across firms. If an additional worker would increase the value of output at Firm A by two dollars but by only one dollar at Firm B, then
aggregate output would increase by shifting workers from Firm B to Firm A. We illustrate the intuition behind this in Figure 1. As is clear, the allocative inefficiency is summarized by the area of the deadweight loss triangle shaded between the optimal allocation of labour \( L^* \), the inefficient allocation of labour \( L' \), and the firms’ marginal products of labour. Importantly, which we will show more formally shortly, the magnitude of the inefficiency is related to the size of (1) the elasticity of labour demands and (2) the wedge between marginal products.

In more general terms, consider a simple model where labour is the only input. Firms differ in their productivity and there is diminishing returns to production. Specifically, let \( y_i = \varphi_i l_i^a \), where \( a \in (0, 1) \) captures the degree of diminishing returns. And, further, let output from all firms be perfectly substitutable for all others, and therefore aggregate output is \( Y = \sum_i y_i \).

To maximize this aggregate, the marginal product of labour across all firms will equalize and thus the optimal allocation of labour across firms is \( l_i^* \propto \varphi_i^{1/(1-a)} \) and aggregate output will be \( \bar{Y} = \left( \sum_i \varphi_i^{1/(1-a)} \right)^{1-a} \). But if there are distortions to firms’ hiring decisions, marginal products will not equalize. Denote the wedge between any given firm \( i \)’s marginal product and the average \( \tau_i \). That is, \( \alpha \varphi_i l_i^{a-1} \tau_i = \alpha \varphi_j l_j^{a-1} \tau_j \) for any \((i, j)\). In this case, the equilibrium allocation of labour across firms is

\[
l_i \propto (\varphi_i \tau_i)^{1/(1-a)},
\]

which is larger than \( l_i^* \) if \( \tau_i > 1 \) and smaller if \( \tau_i < 1 \). Intuitively, if one firm receives a subsidy that others do not, then \( \tau_i > 1 \) and this firm will have an inefficiently large level of employment while
other firms experience the reverse. Aggregating across firms yields total output

\[ Y = \sum_i q_i \left( \frac{(\beta_i \tau_i)^{1/(1-\alpha)}}{\sum_j (\beta_j \tau_j)^{1/(1-\alpha)}} \right)^\alpha. \]  

(2)

Taking the ratio of this and the first-best output \( Y^\ast \), one can show that

\[ \hat{Y} \equiv \frac{Y}{Y^\ast} = \frac{\sum_i l_i^\ast \tau_i^{a/(1-\alpha)}}{\left( \sum_j l_j^\ast \tau_j^{a/(1-\alpha)} \right)^{\alpha}} \leq 1, \]

(3)

where the last line follows from Jensen’s inequality and \( \alpha < 1 \). The inequality will be strict unless all firms face the same distortion \( \tau \). This illustrates the general intuition that any set of wedges that vary across firms will lower aggregate output.

We can approximate the aggregate loss from such wedges using Harbinger triangles to show that the efficiency loss due to differences in marginal products between firms is proportional to the variance of those differences. To see this, note that the size of the deadweight loss triangle in Figure 1, expressed as a share of total payroll, is \( e l_i^2 / 2 \) where \( e \) is the elasticity of employment with respect to labour costs and \( t_i = \tau_i - 1 \) is the wedge to firm-\( i \)'s marginal product. Summing across all firms, the aggregate efficiency consequence of all wedges is \( \sum_i l_i e t_i^2 / 2 \) or, more intuitively,

\[ DWL \approx \frac{e}{2} \times var(t_i), \]

(4)

since \( \sum_i l_i t_i = 0 \).\(^3\) In the case of the simple model described above, we have \( e = \alpha / (1 - \alpha) \) and therefore if \( \alpha = 2/3 \), for example, then \( e = 2 \) and the aggregate efficiency loss is simply given by the variance of wedges alone. And regardless of the elasticity, changes in the variance of distortions will lead to equal proportional changes in the magnitude of the aggregate inefficiency. The variance in marginal products across firms will therefore be a central component of the quantitative analysis to come. And although this is an approximation of the aggregate inefficiency, in Section 3 we develop a richer model with multiple factors of production, multiple sectors, and a continuum of firms that, under certain conditions, results is an equivalent expression.

### 2.2 Detailed Data on Canadian Firms

We exploit a uniquely detailed dataset from Statistics Canada: T2-LEAP. This is an administrative micro-data set that links annual corporate income tax form information (T2 forms) with Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program data (LEAP) that contains firm-specific payroll information. The dataset provides longitudinal information on every statistical enterprise in the Canadian econ-

\(^3\)The condition that \( \sum_i l_i t_i = 0 \) may be interpreted as an aggregate balanced-budget condition if wedges are explicit taxes or subsidies. Alternatively, for non-monetary distortions, it reflects that differences in marginal products \( \tau_i \) are all expressed relative to the average and therefore \( \sum_i l_i \tau_i = 1 \).
omy that hires employees, covering all sectors of the Canadian economy, and firms of all sizes. It provides annual firm-level data documenting the firm’s stock of capital, revenue, employment level, payroll and industry affiliation. It also contains information to identify the entry/exit of a firm and its provincial location. Our analysis spans the period from 2001 to 2015.

In our analysis, we employed only minimal data adjustments and selections due to the administrative nature of the database. The variables we use to compute marginal returns are revenue, payroll and capital, which we calculate using total tangible assets deducting working capital. We exclude any firm-year entry that contains non-positive values on revenue, payroll or capital, to ensure our calculated marginal returns are economically meaningful. This leaves us, on average, over half a million observations per year in our main subsample. Using firms’ industrial code and provincial information, we examine various levels of aggregation, the finest being 31 sectors, and five regions of Canada. The five regions are Atlantic (Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick), Quebec, Ontario, Prairies (Saskatoon, Alberta, Manitoba) and British Columbia. We do not include firms from the territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut).

Our research is conducted under a pilot project launched by Statistics Canada. Under this project, we work directly with synthetic microdata and obtain our quantitative results on the real data from Statistics Canada. The synthetic data modifies the observed values while preserving the underlying covariate relationships between the variables, allowing us to produce and examine detailed aggregates that resemble the ones in the actual data, without revealing any confidential information of firms. Our quantitative results on the actual microdata are released from Statistics Canada by running our code, tested with synthetic data. While our analysis is conducted on firm-level microdata, the released quantitative results are aggregated to protect data confidentiality. Because our subsampling criteria are intuitive and our results are aggregated, working under the pilot project with the synthetic data has no effect on the accuracy of our research.

2.3 Measuring Labour and Capital Market Distortions

The key variables of our study are the dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labour across firms. Under the standard assumption of Cobb-Douglas production technologies, firms produce output according to 

\[ y_j(i) = \varphi_j(i)k_j(i)^{1-\alpha_j}l_j(i)^{\alpha_j}, \]

where \( \alpha_j \) is the labour share of output in sector \( j \) that might differ across industries but not across firms within an industry. It is straightforward to show that firm-\( i \)'s marginal revenue product equals the factor share times the average product. That is,

\[ \text{MRPK}_j(i) = (1 - \alpha_j) \frac{\varphi_j(i)y_j(i)}{k_j(i)}, \]

\[ \text{MRPL}_j(i) = \alpha_j \frac{\varphi_j(i)y_j(i)}{L_j(i)}. \]

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4 It excludes self-employed individuals or partnerships where the participants do not draw salaries.

5 Industries are grouped using the 3-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS).
And under the additional assumption that factor prices are common for all firms, the marginal revenue product of capital of a firm is proportional to the ratio of revenue over the value of its capital stock and the marginal revenue product of labour is proportional to the revenue-payroll ratio. This allows us to rearrange equation (5), to obtain

\[ \ln \left( \frac{p_j(i)y_j(i)}{Rk_j(i)} \right) = -\ln(R) - \ln(1 - \alpha_j) + \ln(MRPK_j(i)), \]

and,

\[ \ln \left( \frac{p_j(i)y_j(i)}{\omega l_j(i)} \right) = -\ln(\omega) - \ln(\alpha_j) + \ln(MRPL_j(i)), \]

where \( R \) and \( \omega \) are the factor prices for capital and labour, respectively.

These expressions allow us to measure the dispersion of marginal returns across firms using a regression method. Consider first the return to capital. The left-hand side of equation (6) is an individual firm’s revenue over capital stock ratio, which can be calculated directly since both a firm’s revenue and its capital stock can be obtained from our data. It can be decomposed into three components: \( \ln(\omega) \) that is constant for all firms, \( \ln(1 - \alpha_j) \) that is sector-specific, and \( \ln(MRPL_j(i)) \) which is the logarithm of the marginal revenue product of capital of an individual firm. Based on equation (6), we then run the following regression for each sample year

\[ \ln \left( \frac{p_j(i)y_j(i)}{Rk_j(i)} \right) = \beta_0 + \sum_{s=1}^{M} \beta_s \gamma_s + \epsilon_j(i), \]

using three-digit industrial codes as our sector dummies \( \gamma_s \). The coefficient \( \beta_s \) captures any sectoral specific factor that contributes to the variation of firms’ revenue over capital, such as the different capital-labour input share across sectors. The constant term \( \beta_0 \) captures the common factors that are constant across all firms. According to equation (6), the residual from the regression is the log marginal revenue product of capital of each individual firm. We run this regression for each year and record the residuals of these regressions. We then compute the variance of these residuals for each year as our measure of the dispersion of marginal revenue product of capital. We can also compare the dispersion of capital returns across regions and across sectors using the variances of the residuals grouped by sector or by region. We can similarly compute the log marginal revenue product of labour with the following regression

\[ \ln \left( \frac{p_j(i)y_j(i)}{\omega l_j(i)} \right) = \beta_0 + \sum_{s=1}^{M} \beta_s \gamma_s + \epsilon_j(i), \]

where \( \omega l_j(i) \) is the total payroll of firms that can be observed directly from our data. Similar to the capital returns, we run the above regression for each year to obtain the residuals, and calculate the variances of the residuals as our measure of dispersion of labour returns across firms.

To fix ideas and provide intuition, we display the distribution of marginal returns to both
labour and capital in Figure 2 based on a log-normal distribution approximation using the standard deviations as measured in our data with these regression methods. Both panels show a notable degree of dispersion in returns and both show increased dispersion across firms from 2001 to 2015. This suggests an overall rise of resource misallocation during this period, but we will show this more precisely shortly. Comparing panels (a) and (b), it is evident that the distribution of marginal returns to capital exhibits greater dispersion across firms than does the distribution of marginal returns to labour. The larger dispersion in labour and capital markets between 2001 and 2015, however, is more difficult to discern although both see increases. Before we quantify these changes and their potential effect on aggregate productivity in Section 4, we first investigate how the dispersion of marginal returns across firms has evolved during the period 2001 to 2015.

2.4 Changes in Marginal Product Dispersion Over Time

We begin by reporting the change in the dispersion of labour and capital returns over time across Canada’s economy as a whole. Specifically, we estimate the variance in log labour returns \( \text{var}(\log(\tau_j^l)) \) and log capital returns \( \text{var}(\log(\tau_j^k)) \) and display the change of each in Figure 3 from 2001 to 2015. We find the variance of both factors’ marginal returns increased substantially, especially after 2006. The variance of log capital returns increases by over 20 per cent while the variance of log labour returns increases by nearly 15 per cent. While there are year-to-year variations in the change, the overall trend towards higher variance in log returns is clear. These changes are economically significant. If we presume an elasticity of \( \epsilon = 3 \), then the change in aggregate deadweight loss would be between 25 and 30 percent. This does not imply TFP would decline by that amount, only that the aggregate deadweight loss in 2015 would be that much larger than it was in 2001. In Sections 3 and 4, we more precisely quantify the effect of distortions on aggregate productivity using a richer model.
There are notable differences across regions as well. Separating the changes in the variance of marginal returns across the five broad regions of Canada – which aggregate the prairie provinces and Atlantic provinces into their respective regions – we find much of the increase is driven by larger variation within the western provinces of British Columbia and the three prairie provinces. Ontario also experiences notable increases in the dispersion of capital returns across firms within that province, especially following the financial crisis. We display these changes in Figure 4. And again, these are economically meaningful increases. They may imply that strong demand for labour and capital in economically expanding regions of Canada over this time, which indeed were the four western provinces and Ontario, was not associated with a sufficiently large movement of workers or investment capital towards those regions.

Finally, and most notably for the quantitative analysis to come, we disaggregate the change in variance in marginal returns by sector. For the 30 sectors for which we are able to estimate such factor returns in the data, we display the change between 2001 and 2015 in Figure 5. It is evident in this figure that many large and influential sectors of Canada’s economy saw increases in our measure of between-firm misallocation. Manufacturing of paper products, primary metals, and transport equipment (i.e., autos) saw large increases. The latter three in particular experienced meaningful increases in capital returns dispersion across firms. Mining, oil and gas also experienced large increases – again, perhaps reflecting an expanding activity that saw insufficient movement of labour and investment towards the sector. Not all large sectors experienced changes, to be sure. Construction and wholesale and retail trade saw little change in the dispersion of their factor returns across firms.

Changes in the variance of log factor returns of the magnitude we document here suggest factor misallocation has increased. This has potentially important implications for Canada’s aggregate
Figure 4: Change in the Variance of Marginal Revenue Products of $L$ and $K$, by Region

Display the change in the variance of log marginal revenue products of capital and labour within five broad regions of Canada from 2001 to 2015.

... economy. Merely documenting the change in dispersion, however, does not shed light on by how much aggregate productivity might be affected. To answer that question requires significantly more structure be imposed on the data. To that end, we turn to our main quantitative modeling analysis that maps to key moments of our firm-level data. With this model, we examine how factor market distortions misallocate labour and capital between sectors and within them. The within-sector dimension to this analysis is unique and only possible with our detailed firm-level data.

3 A Model to Map Marginal Product Variation to Aggregate TFP

To quantify the effect of marginal product variation that we estimated in the previous section, a richer model is required. We develop one here. To begin, we consider a continuum of firms that produce differentiated goods within a set of $J$ sectors. To produce output, firm $i$ in sector $j$ uses labour and capital within a constant returns to scale production technology

$$y_j(i) = \varphi_j(i)k_j(i)^{1-\alpha_j}l_j(i)^{\alpha_j}. \quad (10)$$

Output in sector $j$ is a composite good produced according to

$$Y_j = \left( \int y_j(i)^{\frac{\alpha_j}{\sigma}} di \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\alpha_j}}, \quad (11)$$
Figure 5: Change in the Variance of Marginal Revenue Products Between 2001 and 2015, by Sector

Displays the change in the variance of log marginal revenue products of capital and labour between 2001 and 2015 within each of our 30 sectors. The total size of each sector, in terms of its total revenue, is illustrated by the column of points to the right of the figure.
where $\sigma$ is the elasticity of substitution across firm output. Finally, we presume aggregate output is

$$Y = \prod_{j=1}^{l} \psi_j^{\beta_j},$$

(12)

where $\sum_j \beta_j = 1$.

Solving for the equilibrium allocations of labour and capital across firms is straightforward. Given the CES aggregation of firm output within each sector, there will be a markup $m = \sigma / (\sigma - 1)$ over marginal costs. Total spending on labour and capital will therefore be $p_j(i) y_j(i) / m$, of which $\alpha_j$ is allocated to labour and $1 - \alpha_j$ to capital. Thus, given wedges within the labour and capital markets – $\tau_j(i)^l$ and $\tau_j(i)^k$, respectively – individual firms optimally choose their input quantities to satisfy

$$\tau_j(i)^k \cdot R \cdot k_j(i) = (1 - \alpha_j)p_j(i) y_j(i) / m,$$

(13)

$$\tau_j(i)^l \cdot w \cdot l_j(i) = \alpha_j p_j(i) y_j(i) / m.$$  

(14)

Here we consider distortions as equivalent to taxes on the purchase of labour and capital. Absent factor market wedges, the marginal revenue products of labour and capital would equalize across all firms and sectors. In the absence of distortions, the marginal revenue products of both labour and capital would be the same across all firms and sectors. As discussed earlier, variation in marginal revenue products will reflect variation in both $\tau_j(i)^k$ and $\tau_j(i)^l$. And since undistorted wages, capital costs, and markups are common to all firms, one can use these expressions to determine the equilibrium allocation of employment and capital across sectors. In particular,

$$k_j = \frac{(1 - \alpha_j) \beta_j / \bar{\tau}_j^k}{\sum_{i=1}^{l} (1 - \alpha_i) \beta_i / \bar{\tau}_i^k},$$

(15)

$$l_j = \frac{\alpha_j \beta_j / \bar{\tau}_j^l}{\sum_{i=1}^{l} \alpha_i \beta_i / \bar{\tau}_i^l},$$

(16)

where $\bar{\tau}_j$ denotes the revenue-weighted harmonic mean of capital and labour distortions, respectively. In an undistorted economy, labour and capital would be allocated only according to the intensity with which these inputs are used in production and the importance of each sector in final demand. That is, $l_j^* \propto \alpha_j \beta_j$, and $k_j^* \propto (1 - \alpha_j) \beta_j$. It may be instructive to write equilibrium allocations in terms of optimal allocations and distortions as follows,

$$k_j = k_j^* / \bar{\tau}_j^k,$$

(17)

$$l_j = l_j^* / \bar{\tau}_j^l,$$

(18)

where we implicitly use a balanced-budget restriction on factor distortions to ensure $\sum_j \bar{f}_j / \bar{\tau}_j^f = 1$ for
both factors \( f \in \{l, k\} \). Sectors with high distortions will therefore employ fewer factors relative to an undistorted economy. This matters for aggregate TFP since,

\[
A = \prod_{j=1}^{l} \left( A_j l_j^{\alpha_j} k_j^{1-\alpha_j} \right)^{\beta_j}
\]

and therefore, denoting the ratio of distorted equilibrium values of a variable \( x \) to the optimal values in a counterfactual equilibrium \( x^* \) as \( \hat{x} \equiv x / x^* \), we have

\[
\hat{A} = \prod_{j=1}^{l} \left( \hat{A}_j \left( \frac{\tau_j(I)^k}{\tau_j(I)} \right)^{1-\alpha_j} \right)^{\beta_j}.
\]

Between-sector distortions are captured by the denominator while within-sector distortions are captured by the numerator. Sectoral TFP will change due to distortions altering the within sector allocation of factors and by distorting the firm size distribution. We turn to these next.

Within a sector, distortions to labour and capital allocations can affect the firm size distribution, aggregate sectoral output, and aggregate sectoral TFP. Given sectoral output from equation 11, total sales of firm \( i \) in sector \( j \) is

\[
p_j(i) y_j(i) = P_j Y_j \left( \frac{p_j(i)}{P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma}.
\]

And since prices are a markup over marginal costs,

\[
c_j(i) \propto \frac{1}{q_j(i)} \left( \tau_j(I)^k \right)^{1-\alpha_j} \left( \tau_j(I)^l \right)^{\alpha_j},
\]

we have total sales given by

\[
p_j(i) y_j(i) \propto \left( \frac{q_j(i)}{\tau_j(I)^{1-\alpha_j} \left( \tau_j(I)^l \right)^{\alpha_j}} \right)^{\sigma-1}.
\]

All else equal, higher productivity firms have higher sales. But firms facing higher capital or labour distortions will therefore be smaller than their optimal firm size, which is proportional to \( q_j(i)^{\sigma-1} \). A distorted firm size distribution will also distort the allocation of labour and capital across firms, since the number employed depends on input purchases which itself depends on sales, as we saw

---

\(^6\)Although our model does not feature intersectoral linkages through intermediate inputs, our measure of between-sector distortions is not affected by this modeling choice. The effect of input-output linkages on optimal labour and capital allocations would be fully captured within each sector’s share of total sales. Specifically, given a direct requirements matrix \( A \) total sales would be \( y = (1 - A)^{-1} \beta \), where \( y \) is a vector of sectoral sales \( y_j, (1 - A)^{-1} \) is the Leontief Inverse Matrix, and \( \beta \) is a vector of final demand shares \( \beta_j \) from equation 12. Given this, optimal labour and capital allocations would be proportional to \( \alpha_j y_j \) and \( (1-\alpha_j) y_j \), respectively. Since we use total revenue from data, we would infer the same between-sector distortion measures in a model with full input-output linkages as in this model without them.
in equations 13 and 14. And these allocations determine sectoral TFP through

\[ A_j = \left( \int \left[ \varphi(i)l_j(i)^{\alpha_l}k_j(i)^{1-\alpha_l} \right]^{\alpha_l/d} \frac{d\varphi(i)}{\alpha_l} \right)^{\alpha_l/d}. \]  

To proceed further, summarize labour and capital distortions within a single variable \( \tau_j(i) \equiv (\tau_j(i)^{\alpha_l})^{1-\alpha_l} (\tau_j(i)^{\alpha_k})^{\alpha_l}. \) Using optimal allocations for labour and capital, one can show

\[ A_j = \left( \int \left( \varphi_j(i) \cdot \frac{\bar{\tau}_j}{\tau_j(i)} \right)^{\sigma-1} \frac{d\varphi_j(i)}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}, \]  

which, following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), simplifies to

\[ \log(A_j) = \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \log\left( \int \varphi_j(i)^{\sigma-1} di \right) - \frac{\sigma}{2} \nu^2, \]  

if productivity \( \varphi_j(i) \) and distortions \( \tau_j(i) \) are jointly log-normally distributed across firms within a sector where the variance of (log) distortions is \( \nu^2. \) The within-sector effect of distortions is then summarized by

\[ \hat{A}_j = e^{-\sigma \nu^2/2}. \]  

This expression along with equation 20 are the key variables of our quantitative analysis to come. They summarize how variation in factor market distortions across firms can affect aggregate productivity. Note also that the within-sector effects just derived mirror the approximation of the productivity effect derived in equation 4, which implies the log-normal assumption on the distribution of distortions is weak. If one rejects this assumption, then our results will merely reflect the first-order approximation of the within-sector effect. The between-sector effect does not rely on the log-normal assumption. Our data will allow us to identify both the dispersion of distortions across firms within a sector \( \nu \) and the overall sectoral average distortions \( \bar{\tau}_j. \)

4 Quantitative Analysis

The variance in marginal returns to labour and capital across firms is central to our analysis. As we’ve seen, increases in this dispersion may correspond to increases in the inefficiency with which factors of production are allocated across firms, sectors, or regions in Canada. In this section, we highlight various measures of this dispersion and quantify the extent to which Canada’s aggregate productivity may be reduced as a result. We begin with the within-sector variation in returns across firms before turning to the between-sector distortions summarized by \( \bar{\tau}. \)

Some results are more robust than others. One limitation is the need to aggregate across firms prior to conducting our within-sector analysis. The dispersion measures we present are

\footnote{For a more complete derivation of this and related expressions, see Chen and Irarrazabal (2015b) Online Appendix section 3.}
based on firm-level data, but we must presume log-normally distributed distortions to quantify
the aggregate productivity effect. The between-sector effects, however, do not depend on the
distribution of distortions. This limitation results from the type of access we had with the data,
but future research may be able to conduct a richer and more structural firm-level analysis. In
what follows, we rely on summary moments released from Statistics Canada to us based on our
code mapped to synthetic data. Though a limitation, we have seen that changes in the variance of
marginal returns across firms maps directly into changes in aggregate GDP – both as a first-order
approximation and based on a richer model with log-normally distributed wedges. Our results
may therefore be interpreted, at the very least, as a robust approximation of the true effects.

4.1 Model Calibration

There are relatively few parameters in the model. But they are important. Estimating optimal
labour and capital allocations across sectors requires sector-specific values for two parameters:

1. **Labour’s share of value-added** $\alpha_j$: We use the Canadian national accounts information
   reported in the symmetric input-output tables for 2015 in Statistics Canada data table 36-10-
   0001-01. This parameter is held constant over time.

2. **Each sector’s share of total expenditures** $\beta_j$: For our main results, we use total sales, by
   sector, from our firm-level data. This share is highly correlated with industry output shares
   from the national accounts. Indeed, the correlation between the two is nearly 0.99 in 2015,
   although this share varies over time. In a robustness exercise, we report our main results
   using the latter time-invariant measure.

To estimate within-sector distortions, we also require each sector’s share of aggregate expenditure
but, in addition, we require the elasticity of substitution across products $\sigma$. For our main results we
use $\sigma = 3$ as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). As this is low relative to estimates in the literature, and as
larger values of this parameter correspond to larger efficiency costs, we view this as conservative.
We report alternative results for a range of values.

4.2 Between-Sector Distortions

We begin by quantifying the effect of firm level distortions on the allocation of labour and capital
across sectors. The aggregate effect may be flexibly quantified using equation 20 and, in particular,
is the inverse of the weighted geometric average of labour distortions $\bar{\tau}_j^l$ and capital distortions $\bar{\tau}_j^k$.
Specifically,

$$\hat{A}_{\text{between sector}} = \prod_{j=1}^{J} \left[ \left( \frac{\alpha_j}{\bar{\tau}_j^l} \right)^{\alpha_j} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha_j}{\bar{\tau}_j^k} \right) \right]^{-\beta_j}. \quad (28)$$

Sectors where distortions result in a higher level of employment or capital stock than is optimal to
maximize aggregate productivity will have $\bar{\tau}_j^l < 1$ or $\bar{\tau}_j^k < 1$. Intuitively, this reflects distortions
that lower the marginal cost of labour or capital for firms within that sector, thereby resulting in higher use of either (or both) factors. We report our measures of labour and capital allocations, both observed and optimal, in Table 1. We also report the industry share of total revenue $\beta_j$ and each sector’s labour input share $\alpha_j$.

We find distortions shift the allocation of labour and capital across sectors in quantitatively meaningful ways. In our data, averaged over all years, we observe 8.5% of labour and 15.7% of capital is allocated, for example, to the mining, oil, and gas sector. Given sectoral revenues and labour intensities, however, the optimal share of labour and capital for that sector is 5.7% and 13.4%, respectively. In other sectors, such as most manufactured goods sectors, the optimal allocation is larger than the observed allocations. These differences are large and imply roughly one-quarter of overall employment and capital stock would need to be reallocated across sectors in order to achieve the first-best allocations $l_j^*$ and $k_j^*$. We display the implied measure of average distortions, which is the ratio of observed to optimal allocations, in panel (a) and (b) of Figure 6. While these measures are averaged over all years in our sample (as in Table 1), we separately estimate these distortions for each year to construct the effect on aggregate productivity. We display this in panel (c) of Figure 6. We find between-sector distortions, on average, lower Canada’s aggregate productivity by 22% during our period of study. We also find that such distortions have been gradually worsening since 2004. From 2004 to 2015, worsening misallocation between sectors has lowered aggregate productivity by nearly 12%. Given the period of improvement between 2001 and 2004, we find that aggregate productivity was 6% lower in 2015 than it would have otherwise have been had between-sector distortions remained constant since 2001.

The aggregate effect of between-sector misallocation may be further decomposed into contributions from labour and capital distortions. Comparing panel (a) and (b) of figure 6 makes clear the dispersion in average labour distortions exceed those for capital. We quantify each factor’s individual contribution by exploiting the multiplicative form of equation 28. Specifically, we can capture the contribution of labour misallocation from $\prod_{j=1}^J \left( \frac{\bar{l}_j}{l_j^*} \right)^{-\beta_j \alpha_j}$ and capital misallocation from $\prod_{j=1}^J \left( \frac{\bar{k}_j}{k_j^*} \right)^{1-\beta_j (1-\alpha_j)}$. Of the 22% overall effect, we find nearly two-thirds is accounted for labour misallocation while the remaining one-third is accounted for by capital misallocation. But changes in each factor’s contribution, which we plot in panel (d) of Figure 6 reveals that capital markets fully accounts for the deterioration between 2001 and 2004. Labour markets, for the most part, improved in many years. From 2001 to 2014, between-sector misallocation of labour eased and contributed 3% to aggregate TFP growth. But in 2015, this gain was fully reversed. We find a majority of this drop is due to a rising measure of labour misallocation in Canada’s transport manufacturing sector. Specifically, the optimal share of labour allocated to that sector rises but the observed share rises more slowly. In any case, these broad results suggest the efficiency with which capital is allocated has fallen and has negatively contributed to Canada’s overall productivity growth.

\footnote{The (weighted geometric) average labour distortion across sectors and years is 0.857 and the average for capital distortions is 0.911. And since the total between-sector effect is $\hat{\lambda}_{\text{between sector}} = 0.781$, labour’s contribution to that total is $\log(0.857)/\log(0.781) = 0.62$.}
### Table 1: Allocations and Industry Parameters for Between-Sector Distortions (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Actual Allocations</th>
<th>Optimal Allocations</th>
<th>Revenue Shares</th>
<th>Labour Shares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Oil and Gas</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Mfg.</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Products</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Mfg.</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petro. and Coal Products</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics and Rubber</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmetallic Minerals</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Metals</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricated Metals</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and Electronics</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Equip.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Equip.</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Mfg.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Warehousing</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info and Culture</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance, Real Estate</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof., Sci., and Tech. Services</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. Support and Waste</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Recreation</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel and Restaurants</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reports the average observed labour and capital allocations $l_j$ and $k_j$, the optimal allocations $l'_j$ and $k'_j$, the shares of total revenue $\beta_j$, and the labour input share $\alpha_j$ by sector between 2001 and 2015.
Figure 6: Between-Sector Distortions in Canada

(a) Average Labour Distortions $\bar{\tau}_l$

(b) Average Capital Distortions $\bar{\tau}_k$

(c) Aggregate Effect, 2001-2015

-27.50% -25.00% -22.50% -20.00%


Reduction in Aggregate TFP

(d) Changes due to Labour and Capital

-6.0% -3.0% 0.0% 3.0% 6.0%


Change in Aggregate TFP

Capital Only Labour Only Total

Displays our measure of average between-sector distortions $\bar{\tau}_l$, $\bar{\tau}_k$, and $\bar{\tau}_t$ across industries, in panels (a) and (b). These are averaged across all years. The aggregate effect of these distortions, and how that effect has changed over time, is displayed in panel (c). Finally, panel (d) displays the contribution of labour and capital distortions to changes in the overall aggregate effect.
4.3 Within-Sector Distortions

Firm distortions not only affect allocations between sectors but also affect allocations between firms within each sector. Indeed, the between sector distortions of the previous section captured the average effect of firm-level distortions $\tau_j(i)^k$ and $\tau_j(i)^l$. Such firm-level distortions also change firms’ size and the share of a sector’s employment and capital allocated to each firm. It can therefore lower sectoral TFP, which has implications for aggregate productivity. Specifically, from equation 20, we have

$$\hat{A}_{\text{within sector}} = \prod_{j=1}^{J} \hat{A}_{j}^{\beta_j},$$

(29)

where $\hat{A}_j$ is from equation 27. As discussed, we quantify this from the measured variance in marginal products in the data. Given our model, this will precisely capture the productivity effect if distortions are log-normally distributed and will represent a first-order approximation of the effect in general.

Based on the variance of log distortions $\tau_j(i)$, we estimate $\hat{A}_j$ for each sector over time and report the results in Table 2. Misallocation exists within all sectors, with effects on sectoral productivity ranging from 0.09 in utilities to 0.62 in printing. This reflects the degree to which actual productivity is below our measure of optimal sectoral productivity in a hypothetically undistorted economy. Such large effects are common in the literature, and should not be interpreted as a measure of what is feasible for policy reforms to address. So we look to changes over time as more informative in that regard. Most sectors see improvements but thirteen experience worsening misallocation and therefore falling productivity. Sectoral productivity declines in paper manufacturing by over 4% from 2001 to 2015 due to worsening within-sector misallocation. Plastics and rubber manufacturing see nearly 2.4% reduction. And computer and electronics manufacturing sees its productivity decline by 1.3% relative to a counterfactual where distortions remains constant at their 2001 levels. Aggregating these within-sector effects reveals that from 2001 to 2008 aggregate productivity declined by nearly 6.8%, though improved in recent years to an overall decline of 3.1% by 2015. We display the effect of changes in the aggregate within-sector effect over time in Figure 7.

Much of the change in the aggregate within-sector effects over time is due to changes in the size of each sector. That is, if sectors that have large within-sector distortions grow larger, their weight $\beta_j$ and therefore influence on the overall aggregate effect will grow. We find this reduction in aggregate productivity from within-sector misallocation is driven entirely by growing mining, oil and gas, utilities, and wholesale trade sectors and by a shrinking other services sector. Holding the relative size of each sector fixed at its 2001 level, the aggregate effect of changes in within-sector misallocation is nil. That is, improvements in some sectors are offset by deteriorations in others.

Regardless of the changes in within-sector distortions over time, we estimate large aggregate level effects for Canada’s economy as a whole. In the last row of table 2 we report the aggregate $\hat{A}_{\text{within sector}}$ is below 0.3 in all years. This is not only economically meaningful, but a larger effect on
Table 2: Effect of Within-Sector Distortions on Sectoral Productivity $\hat{A}_j$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Effect on Sectoral Productivity $\hat{A}_j$</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Oil and Gas</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Mfg.</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Products</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Mfg.</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petro. and Coal Products</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics and Rubber</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmetallic Minerals</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Metals</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricated Metals</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>0.415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and Electronics</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Equip.</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Equip.</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Mfg.</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Warehousing</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info and Culture</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance, Real Estate</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof., Sci., and Tech. Services</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. Support and Waste</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Recreation</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel and Restaurants</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reports the average effect of within-sector distortions on sectoral productivity $\hat{A}_j$. The bottom row reports the aggregate effect of these distortions on aggregate productivity, using sectoral revenue shares and equation 29.
aggregate productivity than our measure of between-sector distortions. In fact, given the between-sector estimates of the previous section that average approximately 0.78, this within-sector effect implies that over 80% of the aggregate productivity effect of misallocation across firms in Canada may be due to within-sector distortions. This result is also robust to lower values of the elasticity of substitution across products $\sigma$. Lower values of this lowers the efficiency consequences of distortions, as shown in equation 24. If $\sigma = 2$, for example, we find an aggregate within-sector effect of 0.44 in 2001 and 0.43 in 2015.\footnote{To clarify, higher values of $\hat{A}^U$ mean lower efficiency losses since $\hat{A}^U = 1$ is first-best.} It is our rich firm-level data allows for such within-sector estimates, as sector-level data would only allow for between-sector estimates.

4.4 The Aggregate Effect of Misallocation

Both the between- and within-sector distortions aggregate to affect changes in Canada’s national productivity. We saw that in the early years of our sample, reductions in the extent of distortions lowered misallocation of labour and capital across sectors. This resulted in improvements in aggregate productivity. After 2004, however, changes in distortions increased the extent of misallocation and detracted from aggregate productivity. Changes in the relative size of each sector also affected how within-sector distortions aggregated to affect the national economy. We summarize all of these effects using equation 20, which is equivalent to

$$\hat{A} = \left(\hat{A}^{\text{between sector}}\right) \times \left(\hat{A}^{\text{within sector}}\right).$$

(30)

We display each component in Figure 8.

Between 2001 and 2015, we find a full 8.5% reduction in Canada’s aggregate TFP relative to a counterfactual where labour and capital misallocation across firms remain unchanged.
first half of our sample, from 2001 to 2008, the reduction in aggregate TFP was entirely accounted for by within-sector distortions. Misallocation across sectors improved from 2001 to 2004 but deteriorated thereafter. The net effect of the change was roughly zero. But after the financial crisis, and in particular after 2010, misallocation between sectors was the dominant contributor to lower aggregate TFP. Indeed, the effect of within-sector distortions lessened somewhat, primarily due to modest reductions in the relative size of sectors that featured particularly high average distortions.

4.5 Robustness to Alternative Parameters or Data

While some of our results depend on specific parameter values used in our analysis, our overall conclusion that misallocation has worsened between 2001 and 2015 and that this has quantitatively important implications for aggregate productivity is robust. In this section, we explore some alternative modelling choices and alternative estimates from the data.

4.5.1 Model Parameters

Two parameters govern the magnitude of our results. First, the ease with which output from one firm in a sector may be substituted for output from another in that same sector matters for the productivity effect of distortions. In our main results, we follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and used an elasticity of substitution of $\sigma = 3$. Higher values of this parameter would mean distortions would matter more, and lower values would mean distortions would matter less. We find that for $\sigma = 2$ the contribution of within-sector distortion changes would subtract 2.1% from aggregate productivity from 2001 to 2015, instead of the 3.1% in our main results. For $\sigma = 4$, the effect would
grow to 4.1%. This parameter does not matter for between sector distortions.

A second parameter matters for both within and between sector misallocation. The size of each sector will affect both the inferred optimal allocation of labour and capital in each sector and will affect the weights applied to each sector when aggregating. We used the size of each sector as implied by our data, which also changed over time. As an alternative, one could use the size as reported in sectoral gross output data from Statistics Canada. As discussed earlier, much of the aggregate effect of within-sector misallocation is due to changes in the relative size of sectors over time. Holding $\beta_j$ fixed at their 2015 levels in the gross output data, we find the aggregate effect roughly zero. Within-sector misallocation remains important in terms of levels, with $\hat{A}_{within \ sector} = 0.28$ in this robustness exercise in 2015 compared to 0.284 in our main analysis. This parameter is not relevant for $\hat{A}_j$. The between sector effects, however, grow larger using this alternative measure of $\beta_j$. We find aggregate TFP falls 11.3% due to worsening between-sector misallocation, compared to 5.6% in our main results. The overall effect in this robustness exercise is therefore larger than the 8.5% in our main results and we conclude our approach to $\beta_j$ was conservative. Note that this is not due to peculiarities in our data, using the overall aggregate revenue shares in our data across all years (that is, using a time invariant measure of $\beta_j$ from our firm-level data) would imply a total effect of -11.3% as well.

4.5.2 No Entry/Exit of Firms

Changes in a country’s aggregate misallocation must come from one of the two sources, either through the change of misallocation across operating firms or through the entry and exit of firms. Furthermore, entry and exit of firms are sensitive to the business cycle. That is, there are usually higher firm exit rates, especially for small and young firms, during recessions. In this subsection, we consider a sub-sample that excludes the entry and exit of firms and examine firms that operate during the entire sample. This robustness check helps us better understand the long-term trend of misallocation in Canada and whether the entry and exit of firms improve or worsen the efficiency of resource allocation in Canada.

In the T2-LEAP data, each firm is assigned with a unique longitudinal identifier, which allows us to track firms over time. We keep firms that operate normally, i.e., with positive revenue, capital stock and payroll, during the entire sample period from 2001 to 2015, which leaves us with over one hundred thousand observations per year in this sub-sample. We then compute the variations of average productivity (MRPL, MRPK) of these firms, as described in Section 2, and compare them with our findings for all firms in the previous section.

Restricting to a sample of only firms present across all fifteen years in our sample, we find no substantive change in our main results. We estimate the contribution of changes in within-sector distortions to aggregate productivity changes are -6.5% between 2001 and 2008 and -3.5% between 2001 and 2015 in this sub-sample of firms. This compares to -6.8% and -3.1% in the full sample. It is only the within-sector margin where this concern over firm selection is potentially important. Between-sector measures of labour and capital allocations may be estimated without firm-level
data as they depend only on sector-level data.

5 Policy Discussion

Measuring the magnitude and consequences of resource misallocation, though in some ways may be somewhat abstract, provides important information for policy makers. It can further shed light on a potentially cause of Canada’s relatively slower productivity growth in recent years and help direct efforts towards potential reform options. In this section, we discuss some of these issues.

Most importantly, we emphasise that the implied change in Canada’s aggregate productivity from changes in firm-level distortions and the resulting misallocation are quantitatively important. For perspective, the Penn World Table (version 9.1) reports Canada’s TFP was 0.93 of the US level in 2000 and 0.83 in 2015. This represents an 11 percent deterioration in Canada’s relative aggregate productivity. Our estimates suggest that increasing misallocation of labour and capital across firms might account for over 8.5 percentage points of that decline. The dollar effect of this is equivalent to nearly $200 billion in foregone real income per year, or over $16,000 per household. The changing efficiency with which factors of production are allocated across firms, sectors, and regions of Canada is a critically important aspect of Canada’s economy.

The largest and most robust contribution to lower aggregate productivity growth between 2001 and 2015 was rising misallocation of labour and capital between sectors, especially in the capital market. Policy makers have for many years struggled with issues around inter-provincial trade barriers, the efficiency of Canada’s banking system, harmonising of securities, and finance regulations across provinces. To the extent that there is significant industry variation across provinces, such barriers may inhibit the efficient allocation of capital across sectors. The volatility of Canada’s economy (in particular the oil producing regions) may also matter. As capital is long lived, misallocation may result from the slow speed with which it responds to economic shocks. It may reallocate in an efficient manner in time, but cannot do so instantaneously. As volatility increases, this may become a more important consideration. Our research provides little guidance to policy makers around the specific sources of capital wedges or around specific policy interventions that may alleviate the aggregate costs. Our results do, however, point to the potentially significant macroeconomic implications of distortions in Canada’s capital market worsening since 2001. Future research exploring this area would be valuable.

Our results also speak to the potentially important effect of migration costs and labour mobility restrictions. While we do not explicitly measure inter-provincial barriers to labour mobility, our between-sector distortions will partially reflect such barriers. Provinces, after all, differ in the composition of economic activities. Some industries are larger in some regions than others – such as oil and gas in Alberta or finance in Ontario. Policy makers in Canada have long sought to minimize the cost of moving between provinces, though much remains to be done. British Columbia and Alberta, for example, implemented the Trade, Investment, and Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA) in 2009 in an effort to mutually recognize or harmonize rules and regulations.
that make trade and migration difficult. The recent Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), which began in 2017, hopes to make progress between all provinces. Efforts to ensure credentials and occupational licenses are easily transferable across provincial boundaries may help lower labour market distortions and therefore help increase overall productivity.

6 Conclusion

The efficiency with which labour and capital are allocated across firms matters for an economy’s aggregate productivity. This is well known. But how potential resource misallocation changes over time and how that may contribute to productivity growth in Canada has not previously been investigated. Our analysis exploits access to uniquely detailed firm-level administrative data to measure the magnitude and consequences of labour and capital misallocation across firms not only in levels but also in changes between 2001 and 2015. We find, as most studies in this area do, that misallocation has a significant negative effect on overall productivity. But, importantly, we also find that misallocation has consistently worsened in Canada since 2001. Our estimates suggest this decreasing allocative efficiency of labour and capital markets subtracts 8.5 percentage points from Canada’s aggregate productivity. This is meaningful not only because it is large, but also because it accounts for three-quarters of the declining relative productivity of Canada compared to the United States. The country’s lagging productivity performance is an ongoing area of concern for policy makers and our results point to a potentially important contributing factor. There remains much work to be done to uncover the underlying causes of misallocation and to deploy richer methods that map a full structural model to the firm-level data if it becomes more widely available. Future research in these areas would be valuable.
References


